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In his essay, “Intentionality and Physiological Processes,” Richard Sorabji claims that
Aristotle maintains a sharp distinction-between the formal and material causes of sensation.1 To
that end, Sorabji interprets a cluster ofAristotelianTormulae about sensation as descriptions that
exclusively pertain to perception's material cause. This material cause, according to Sorabji, is
the process that the sense organ undergoes during an episode of sensation. These Aristotelian
formulae fall roughly into three main groups: the claim that what perceives receives form (which
I will call the formal reception thesis), the claim that what perceives receives form without matter
(which I will call the anahylic reception thesis2), and the claim that what perceives becomes
actually like or such as its object from being potentially like or such (which I will call the
likeness thesis). According to Sorabji, when Aristotle asserts any of these three theses, he is
referring to one and the same physiological process by which the organ becomes actually and
literally black or white, hot or cold, dry or fluid.
This physiological account, however, is not Aristotle's only explanation of sensation.
Sorabji tells us that Aristotle does have another doctrine concerning the sense power becoming
aware of its object, but it is expressed in the quite different terms of actual identity. In DA 3.2
(425b26-426a26), Aristotle explains sense perception in terms of his general theory of causation
in Physics 3.3, where actual teaching and actual learning are said not to constitute two activities,
but one and the same activity that goes on in the learner.
The application to sense perception of this causal theory is that the activity of a
sound in working on one's hearing and the activity of hearing are not two
activities, but one and the same activity, and located not in the organ but in the
sense (en tei kata dunamin).3
Sorabji, however, immediately makes the point that “this doctrine about the activity of sense tells
us nothing about whether the organ takes on sound.”4
Sorabj i notes that two of these allegedly physiological descriptions, i.e. the formal
reception thesis and the likeness thesis, are linked “...at 429al5-16, where it is said that if
thinking is like perceiving, the thinking part of the soul must be able to receive form and be
potentially such as its object.”5 Although this passage is part of Book 3, Chapter4 of the De
Anima, a chapter devoted to explaining how the faculty of thought, νους or mind, is separate
from the body, these descriptions nevertheless have no application beyond thè physiological
sense that Sorabji claims they have. They are merely the beginning of Aristotle's treatment of
νους, “the first tentative comparison”6 with sensation according to a physiological description,
but a comparison he soon abandons. Although Aristotle does say that νους possesses forms (e.g.
in thinking of a stone (431b28-432al)), according to Sorabji, νους does not receive such forms,
much less are they received without matter.
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The stone is not described as 'matter' and its form is not spoken of as 'received,'
probably because these words have expressed a doctrine about the sense-flrgan,
and thinking does not in the same way involve an organ, in his view. Instead, the
comparison is with the doctrine which does not concern the organ but the sense,
that the activity of sound is in the sense and is not merely such as, but identical
with, the activity of hearing.”7
For Sorabji, then, the faculties of sense and of thought, on the one hand, and the organs of
sense, on the other, cannot be described in the same terms. .TheJormal reception thesis and the
anahylic reception thesis cannot apply to νους since they only apply to organs, ancLvouç has.no
organ. On the other hand, although the faculty of thought, like the sense faculty, does become
one with its object, it does not do so, however, by receiving the form of its object. What does
receive form, i.e. the sense organ, merely becomes such as, but not identical with its object. At
least part of Sorabji's claim that expressions describing the physiological processes of sensation
but having no application beyond the physiological, then, requires that Aristotle does not
describe νους in the same terms. If either the formal reception thesis, the anahylic reception
thesis or the likeness thesis applies to νους, then that fact undermines Sorabji's claim that these
descriptions apply exclusively to sense organs.
I believe, however, that Sorabji is mistaken about Aristotle's description of νους. Even
after the introductory remarks about the similarity between sensation and thought, Aristotle, in
his considered position in DA 3.4, continues to maintain that the faculty of thought receives its
objects. While it is not as obviously asserted as the thesis that the objects of thought are without
matter, nevertheless, the formal reception thesis clearly applies to the activity of νους since it
provides a key to the first main argument of the chapter. Aristotle's account of νους, then,
incorporates an Aristotelian formula that Sorabji claims applies only to sensation, and only to
sensation's material cause. Consequently, because this descriptions applies to a faculty that
Sorabji admits has no organ, he cannot maintain his restriction of the formal reception thesis to
the sense organs alone.
Although he does not engage in an extended exegesis of DA 3.4, an analysis of this
chapter, from which Sorabji draws his example of the coupling of the formal reception principle
and the likeness principle, shows that νους is indeed receptive. While many translations of this
chapter do not make the receptive nature of νους obvious, other translators and commentators
-clearly do consider this fact to be so obvious as to be unremarkable. Charles Kahn, for instance,
simply translates a key passage of this chapter as follows: “hence nous has no nature other than
this: the capacity (to receive noetic form)....”8 However, since there is disagreement among
scholars as to whether νους receives forms, the point deserves some analysis and justification.
In analyzing this chapter, one first finds Aristotle arguing throughout that νους is in some
significant way non-bodily, which he describes as unmixèd (429al8), not mixed with the bpdy
(429a24), separable (429b6), and separable from the body (429b23). Aristotle in this chapter
seems to give three main arguments for this thesis. First, however, he proposes the comparison
between thinking and perceiving, the comparison which Sorabji calls “tentative” and one that
Aristotle later abandons. Aristotle tells us that “if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will
consist in a being acted upon by the object of thought.. .”(429al2)9 and goes on to say that the
part of the soul by which it thinks “...then, must be impassive, but receptive of the
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form...”(429al5). As a consequence of being like perceiving, thought is a “being acted upon” by
its objects in some sense, and this implies that it, like sense, is still impassive and “receptive of
form.” Aristotle can maintain that νους, like sense, is both a “being acted upon” and
“impassive,” since, as he explained in 2.5, the “being acted upon” that characterizes sense, is a
special kind that should receive a special name (417M2-17). It is this distinct aspect of sense
that merits the label “impassive,” and this distinct aspect applies to νους as well. If the
comparison with sensation as receptive of form is merely tentative, as it is on Sorabji's
interpretation, the point of the comparison, then, seems only to show that νους is impassive in a
manner similar to the sense faculty.
,.
;
What follows this comparison is the first of the three argument that νους» enjoys a special
kind of separateness from the body. Aristotle argues that νους is “unmixed” based on the fact
that its range is limitless. For this argument to succeed, however, it is necessary that νους
receive its objects.
The intellect, then, since it thinks all things, must needs ... be unmixed with any....
For the presence of what is foreign to its nature hinders and obstructs it...(429al820).
Aristotle apparently believes that, given that the intellect has all things for its objects, it is
necessarily unmixed with any of them. However, if one supposes, as Sorabji does, that being an
object of the intellect has nothing to do with the intellect receiving it as an object, then Aristotle's
support for this claim seems baffling. Aristotle's added premise apparently makes the counterfactual claim that, if the intellect had a foreign nature present, it would be hindered and
obstructed, which apparently we are to believe is not the case (429a20). Hence, the sense of
“hinder” and “obstruct” here conveyed is that of short-circuiting, i.e. the simple non-functioning
of the intellect. The principle seems to say that if the intellect had a foreign nature present, then
it would just not work at all.
Reading 429a20 this way, it seems to be a rather perplexing statement. What makes it so
perplexing is the phrase “the presence of what is foreign to its nature.” One could understand
more easily how the presence of something foreign could be a hindrance if Aristotle were talking
about an organ of a knowing power, e.g. the eye. A mote of dust could be in the eye, and this
could hinder its performance. However, Aristotle evidently is talking about a power that has no
organ (429a26). The intellect, precisely because it has no organ, cannot have something foreign
present, in the sense of intruding from an extrinsic source, and yet be hindered. For if something
is present to this non-bodily power, then either it is constitutive of itself (in which case it is not
foreign), or it is the intellect's object (in which case the intellect is not hindered). However, one"
and the same thing cannot be both foreign to the intellect and a hindrance to its operation. If the
presence of something foreign that hinders the intellect js, an-impossible situation, then it is
utterly mysterious why Aristotle should say that it is the reason why the intellect, which knows
all, is unmixed.
The fact that 429a20 does not seem to make much sense in itself is our first indication
that something is wrong. D. W. Hamlyn interprets this argument of DA 3.4 (almost) exclusively
in terms of the identity thesis whereby the intellect becomes its object. He, like Sorabji, sees
Aristotle's formula about receiving form without matter as intelligible only with regard to sense
organs10. Noting that 429al6 identifies two formulae as points of similarity between sense and
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intellect (i.e. the formal reception thesis and the likeness thesis), he believes that the first is so
tied to Aristotle's account of a physiological process in the sense organ, that it is unintelligible
when applied to νους. Thus, he reads this argument for the intellect being unmixed as follows:
The intellect must be unmixed with anything, since it thinks everything, and is
thus, according to the formula, potentially like all things without being actually
such. It must therefore be solely potential, if it is to think all things, and is before
thinking nothing actual. If it contained anything actual it could not become this,
as it must do according to the formula if it is to think it.11—
Hence, for Hamlyn, the claim that the intellect is unmixed means that it is nothing actual. This
conclusion follows from the two premises: “whatever knows is potentially, but not actually like
its object” and “the intellect knows all things.”
This interpretation has a certain plausibility since it captures part of Aristotle's thought on
knowing powers. However, two points speak against it being Aristotle's whole intent. First, it
does not really take into account 429a20 which I have tried to show is troubling and needs
explaining. According to Hamlyn, the line merely asserts that the intellect, in order to become
like its object, cannot already be actually like its object. Second, Hamlyn's construal makes
Aristotle's point that the intellect is nothing actual before it thinks to be just a repetition of the
claim that the intellect is unmixed. For Hamlyn, this is not surprising since he reads the
separation and unmixed character of the intellect in the weakest way possible.12 However, for
Aristotle, the fact that the intellect is nothing actual until it thinks is some further point beyond
the point that it is unmixed.13
An examination of the overall structure of Aristotle's argument shows the inadequacy of
this reading of the text, especially of Smith's translation of 429a20. The argument consists of
two universal premises and a universal conclusion. The first premise is as follows:
1. Whatever foreign nature that is present to a power, hinders (i.e. prevents the
operation of) that power.
The conclusion claims:
3. The intellect is unmixed.
If we assume that “unmixed” is equivalent to “does not have a foreign nature present,” it is clear
that the only hope Aristotle has for making a valid syllogism is to claim as the minor premise:
2. No intellect is hindered.14
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However, there are still two problems with the argument as thus presented. First, what is
the justification for the major premise; why should “the presence of something foreign” entail
being hindered? Second, although all he would have to assert as evidence for the claim that
νους is not hindered is that the intellect actually knows anything at all, Aristotle's actual minor
premise is “νους knows all things.” The argument, then, seems to require a stronger connection
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between something not being present when the intellect knows all things and the implication that
the intellect is unmixed.
Only if we posit that νους is receptive of its objects can we make sense of the connection
Aristotle sees between the universal capacity of νους and its status as unmixed. Aristotle's logic
requires that he connect the intellect with being unmixed by a denial that it is hindered, which he
seems to think he accomplishes by claiming that νους knows all things. Only on the supposition
that knowledge is a kind of reception would it be necessary for Aristotle to claim that νους
knows all things in order to deny that it is hindered. Given this supposition, however, if the
intellect were to know less than all things,-it-would be hindered from receiving some objects, and
so be restricted in some way. Any other sense of knowledge* e.g. as simply becoming identical.
with the object (without receiving it), could take place without necessarily being a knowledge of
all things, and still the knowing power would not be hindered. Thus, the only way Aristotle's
actual words could measure up to the demands of his argument is if knowing is a kind of
receiving. Consequently, the claim that “νους knows all” has to be equivalent to “νους receives
all.” This is also equivalent to the claim that there is nothing that νους does not receive, i.e.
νους is not hindered. “To hinder,” then, as Aristotle is using the term, does not mean “fails to
function” as Smith's translation would lead one to believe, but rather means “impedes or blocks
the reception of something.”
Understanding Aristotle's use of “hinder” in this sense gives the necessary justification
for the connection between knowing all things and being unmixed. The universal scope of νους
implies that it lacks the hindrance that it would have if something were present, only because
νους receives what it knows and is thereby united with its object. Thus, because there is in fact
no restriction on what νους receives, Aristotle concludes that νους does not have the hindrance
of something being present and, as it were, displacing its object. For Aristotle, it is in virtue of
the intellect's receptivity that there is an implied equation between having nothing present and
being unmixed, an equation that does not apply to the senses. For although the senses are
relatively unhindered, the fact that they do not receive all forms, i.e. know all things, but only the
forms of their proper objects, is to be explained by the fact that they are mixed, i.e. that they have
organs.
Aristotle's connection between the intellect's universal receptivity and it having nothing
present also makes sense of his other conclusion, i.e. that νους has no nature other than to be in
potency prior to knowing (429a22-24). The intellect has no nature beyond its receptive capacity,
since that would prevent the reception of some form (and so it would not receive them all).
Instead, it is merely in potency to receiving its objects and to being united with them, since to
receive a form is the same as to be united with its object. Both of these points deserve a fuller
elaboration which is not possible here. For the present, however, we can conclude that on the
force of the logic of the argument, νους, indeed, is receptive of form.
Given that Sorabji is highly critical of the ancient and medieval commentary tradition on
other interpretive points, it is not surprising that we find a member of that tradition, Aquinas,
disagreeing with him on his understanding of νους. Aquinas took 429a20 to mean that the
presence of some nature in a knowing faculty hindered that faculty in respect of receiving that
nature. As he says in his commentary on the De Anima, “Anything that is in potency with
respect to an object, and able to receive it into itself, is, as such, without that object.”15 The
intellect, however, is unrestricted with respect to what it can know, for it can know all things, and
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so in itself it lacks all of the natures which it receives. “...If the intellect were restricted to any
particular nature, this connatural restriction would prevent it from knowing other natures”.16
Thus, according to his interpretation, since the intellect receives the forms of all bodies, it must
lack the form of any body. Aquinas, therefore, concludes that the intellect is spatially separate,
that is, it has an operation in which the body does not share. Even though Aristotle's version of
the argument does not claim that the intellect knows all bodies, Aquinas' interpretation
nevertheless accords with the overall structure of Aristotle's argument by understanding the
intellect to be receptive.
The interpretation of νους as receptive gainsiurther support if one examines the Greek.
In Greek, 429a20 reads: “παρεμπφαινομενον γάρχω λυει,το-αλλοτριον κάν& ντιφρατιει.”
What is essential for Aquinas' interpretation is that το άλλότριον be translated as the object of
κωλύει and άντιφράτχει as the translation of William of Moerbeke, from which Aquinas
worked, renders the passage: “For what appeared inwardly would prevent and impede what was
without.”17 In this translation, “what was without” (extranem) is William's rendering of το
άλλότριον, and in Latin it is clearly the direct object of “prevent and impede” (prohibebit et
obstruet), William's rendering of κωλύει and αντιφράττει respectively.18 It seems that Aquinas'
reading, prompted by William's translation, then, fits more with the thrust of Aristotle's
argument, since “hinder” in the argument, as noted above, carries with it the notion of blocking
the reception of something. For, only if νους is receptive is Aristotle's claim that νους knows
all things evidence that the intellect is unimpeded with respect to what it receives (τό
άλλότριον). The reading that Aquinas and William give the passage highlights the fact that
Aristotle has not changed his mind with regard to the claim at 429al5 that thinking, like
sensation, involves the reception of form.
In addition to the added coherence that it gives to the argument of DA 3.4, there is other
evidence that Aristotle meant αντιφράττει to convey the sense of impeding the reception of
something and τό άλλότριον as its object. Of the six other genuine uses of άντιφράττειν in
Aristotle's work, four of them concern something (the earth or some celestial body) blocking the
light of the sun or the moon in an eclipse, but all of them require that the word mean “block the
passage or reception of something.”19 A typical example can be found at Posterior Analytics II,
2 (90al8) where Aristotle explains that in an eclipse, the earth hinders the light of the moon.
“What is an eclipse? The privation of the moon's light by the interposition of the earth.”20 In this
passage, Aristotle clearly uses άντιφράττειν to signify that something blocks or stands in the
way of moonlight. In this context, the verb does not, nor could it, mean simply “to prevent the
operation of something,” as Smith’s reading of429a20 would require. Since Aristotle uses the
verb άντιφράττειν to describe the obstruction and non-reception of an object of observation
elsewhere, it lends further support to the reading of429a20 given by William and interpreted by
Aquinas where το άλλότριον is the object of αντιφράττει, and what appears inwardly
(παρεμφαινόμενον) is not something foreign.
'
' ~
From the foregoing, it should be apparent that, for Aristotle, the faculty of thought is
legitimately characterized as being receptive of its objects. To construe Aristotle as holding that
it is not renders a significant part of DA 3.4 to be of highly questionable internal coherence, since
it makes it seem that he is claiming that something foreign might intrude into a power that has no
organ and render that power inoperable. Moreover, failure to acknowledge the intellect's
receptivity renders what is clearly supposed to be an explanation (mind is unmixed because it
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knows all things) otiose and virtually unrelated to the logic of his argument. Finally, the denial
of the claim that νους is receptive forces onto Aristotle's Greek a sense that is totally inconsistent
with other uses of the same words. For these reasons, it seems best to hold that, at least through
his first argument in DA 3.4, Aristotle did not begin his treatment of νους with a merely tentative
comparison between the faculties of thought and perception according to the formal reception
thesis, only to later abandon the claim that this thesis holds for νους. Rather, throughout this
part of the chapter, Aristotle believes that νους is receptive since its receptivity is essential for
the validity of his argument and the consistency of his thought.
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